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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Appellant Twylla Robinson (hereinafter, "Appellant") filed Appeal on March 26, 
2013, following the trial court's February 12,2013, Judgment on its February 6,2013, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order Granting Summary Judgment in favor of Respondent Connie Mueller, as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Hazel Marquardt (hereinafter, "Respondent"). R., Vol. I, 
pp. 95 and 103. This decision of course derived from a premises liability (trip and fall) action 
brought by the Appellant against the Respondent wherein the Appellant alleged that on September 
6,2009, the Respondent breached a duty of care owed to the Appellant by allowing a dangerous 
condition to exist in an apartment owned by the Respondent. R., Vol. I, pp. 7-10. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
The Respondent concurs with the Appellant's statements regarding the course of the 
proceedings. 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. The premises at issue is a two story house located at 12 Cottonwood Drive, St. 
Maries, Idaho. R., Vol. I, p. 96. 
2. The premises was constructed in 1915. R., VoL I, p. 32. This occurred twelve years 
before the promulgation of the Uniform Building Code in 1927. Id. at p. 96. 
3. The premises was purchased by Hazel Marquardt, her husband, in 1973. R., Vol. 
I, 73 and 96. 
4. At the time of their purchase, the second floor consisted an apartment that was 
accessible from a separate entrance. R., Vol. I, pp. 35 and 97. Also, at the time of their purchase 
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the apartment had a door that lead out to a portion ofthe roof. Id. at pp. 33 and 97. This area is a 
recessed dormer. Id at p. 33. The exterior dormer did not have railings. at 33 and 97. 
5. At the time of purchase 1973, Benewah County, Idaho, had not yet adopted 
Uniform Building Code. l R., VoL I, pp. 33 and 96. It did so a year later 1974. Id Thus, there 
were no code requirements in effect at the time of purchase. 
6. From the time that Marquardt owned the premises 1973 to the time ofthe incident 
of September 6, 2009, there had not been any remodels or structural changes that would compel a 
building permit or compliance with any applicable code. R., Vol. I, pp. 33, 37 and 96. That is, the 
house, including the recessed dormer and the absence of any railings, was grand-fathered in and 
hence no railings were required. Id 
7. Meanwhile, in March, 2007, the subject apartment was rented to tenant Bryan 
Winkelman, and he moved in on April 1,2007. R, Vol. I, pp. 41 and 97. At all times during his 
tenancy, Winkelman knew that there were no railings surrounding the exterior dormer. Id. At no 
during his tenancy did any structural changes occur to the exterior dormer or apartment. Id. at 
pp. 42 and 97. At no time during his tenancy did he ever request railings or structural changes to the 
exterior recessed dormer. Id. at pp. 43 and 97. 
8. In fact, Winkelman testified that he was warned by Marquardt about the absence of 
railings when he moved in. R, Vol. I, pp. 38 and 97. 
9. On September 5, 2009, Winkelman met the at a local bar St. Maries, 
during the city's "Paul Bunyan Days" festival. R, VoL I, pp. 42 ili'1d 97. the early 
hours of September 6, 2009, the Appellant retreated Winkelman to his Cln"rlrYlPl'Y after 
Uniform Building Code is now known as the International Building Code. R., VoL I, p. 37. 
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having consumed alcoholic beverages. !d. When they arrived, Winkelman opened the door to the 
recessed dormer to let in cool air and enjoy the view. fd. at pp. 39, and 97. fact, Appellant 
and Winkelman walked out onto the recessed dormer then returned inside. Winkelman said that 
he told the Appellant not to go out onto the dormer and he left to retrieve an item from his car. fd. 
at pp. 40, 42 and 97. While he was briefly gone, the Appellant \\Tapped herself in a blanket and 
walked toward the recessed dormer. fd. at pp. 40 and 97. As she approached the doorway and began 
to step out, the Appellant tripped, presumably over the blanket, landed on the recessed dormer, rolled 
off the dormer and fell approximately 12 feet to the ground. fd. at pp. 40 and 97. 
10. At the time of the September 6,2009, incident, the premises was ovmed by Hazel 
Marquardt. Ms. Marquardt passed away following the incident, and her daughter, Connie Mueller 
is the Personal Representative of the Estate. R., Vol. I, p. 34. 
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the trial court erred in granting the Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment when defining the scope of the duty of care owed by a residential landlord to the social guest 
of said landlord's tenant, and thereafter concluding that the Respondent did not breach the duty owed 
in this instance. 
B. Whether this Court should award fees and costs to the Respondent. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
.4.11 court's standard of review of a lower court's decision on summary judgment 
IS same standard applied by the lower court in ruling on the Vreeken v. Lockwood 
Engineering, v., 148 Idaho 89, 218 P.3d 1150 (2009), this Court 
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When reviewing an order for summary judgment, this Court applies the same 
standard of review that was used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for 
summary judgment. Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 
160 P.3d 743, 746 (2007). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter o flaw. " I.R.C.P. 56(c). The burden is on the moving party 
to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Cafferty v. Dep't o/Transp., 
Div. 0/ Motor Vehicle Servs., 144 Idaho 324, 327, 160 P.3d 763, 766 (2007). "If 
there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question oflaw remains, over which 
this Court exercises free review." Cristo, 144 Idaho at 307, 160 P.3d at 746 (quoting 
Infanger v. City a/Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1102 (2002)). 
Vreeken, 148 Idaho at 101, 218 P.3d at 1162. 
B. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE DUTY OF 
CARE AND THEREAFTER DETERMINING THAT THE RESPONDENT DID 
NOT BREACH SAID DUTY? 
1. Introduction. 
The issue in this case regards the scope of the duty of care owed by a landlord to the social 
guests of his or her tenants. Ifthis Court agrees with the trial court's analysis in defining the scope 
of the duty of care, then based on the undisputed facts it is axiomatic that no duty was breached. 
That said, "The existence of a duty is a question of law for" the court to decide. Harrigfeld v. 
Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 138,90 P.3d 884,888 (2004) (citing Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 
985 P.2d 669 (1999)). 
In this instance, the trial court concluded that the duty owed by a landlord to a social guest 
a tenant is same as that duty which would be owed by the tenant to the social guest. R., Vol. 
I, p. 99. In particular, the trial court said: 
Had [the Appellant] sued [the tenant] duty owed by [the tenant] would be that 
owed to a licensee - a duty to inform about dangerous conditions which were k,'lovvn 
and not reasonably discoverable by the social guest. It ma.kes no sense to impose a 
higher duty of care [on the Respondent] ... than that owed by [the tenant] .... 
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* * * * * 
[Thus,] the duty owed by [the Respondent] was to disclose to the lessee, [the tenant] 
the condition of the porch area and the lack of handrails. The undisputed facts show 
that [the Respondent] did so inform [the tenant]. It then became the duty of [the 
tenant], as possessor ofthe property ... to disclose to [the Appellant] the condition 
the porch area. 
R., Vol. I, pp. 99 and 101-02. sum, the trial court rejected the Appellant's request a 
heightened duty of care should be imposed on residential landlords, and also concluded that the 
Respondent did not breach a duty of care under well established principles ofIdaho premises liability 
law because she warned the guest, vis-a-vis the tenant, of the allegedly dangerous condition. R., Vol. 
I, pp. 99 and 102. 
Clearly, the Appellant disagreed with the trial court's decision, hence this appeal. However, 
the basis of her disagreement is a misunderstanding of premises liability law in Idaho, including a 
misunderstanding of this Court's decision in Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984), 
where she believes that the Stephens Court stands for the principle that a landlord owes the social 
guest of a tenant a duty of reasonable care in the maintenance of premises; and, she suggests 
that the Respondent breached a duty by failing to exercise reasonable care or even warning 
Appellant. This is wrong. In the alternative, the Appellant contends that if Stephens does not stand 
for this proposition, then this Court should broaden the scope of Stephens and essentially impose a 
greater duty of care on a residential landlord in Idaho because there "is no good reason" not to. This 
HLa.",-v'" no sense, as will be discussed later in this Brief. Finally, the Appellant contends that 
"catch-all" duty that every person owes a duty of care to prevent harm to others should 
case. 
. . 
IS wrong III of the specific and defined duties of care incumbent 
occupiers of land in Idaho. 
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2. Premises Liability Law in Idaho with Regard to a Licensee/Social Guest. 
Before addressing the Appellant's contentions, a brief primer on the decades 
development of premises liability law in Idaho with regard to licensees may be in order. As this 
Court surely is aware, Idaho has clearly established the duties owed by an owner or by an occupier 
of premises to an injured third persons. And, it begins with defining the status ofthe injured person. 
Indeed, "The distinction between trespassers, licensees, and invitees is the controlling test in 
determining the scope and extent of the duty of care owed by landowners to entrants. O'Guin v. 
Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 14, 72 P.3d 849, 854 (2003). See also Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 
125 Idaho 397, 399, 871 P.2d 814, 816 (1994)." Boots v. TVinters, 179 P.3d 352, 356, 145 Idaho 
389,393 (Idaho App. 2008). 
In this instance, there is no dispute that the Appellant was a licensee/social guest of the 
tenant. "A licensee is a visitor who goes upon the premises of another 'with the consent of the 
landovvTIer in pursuit of the visitor's purpose. Likewise, a social guest is also a licensee." 
Holzheimer, 125 Idaho at 400,871 P.2d at 817. 
With that, the "duty owed to a licensee is narrow. A landowner is only required to share with 
the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land." Id. Perhaps the Court in 
Evans v. Park, ll2 Idaho 400, 732 P.2d 369 (Idaho App. 1987), said it best: 
InKellerv. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 671 P.2d 1112 (Ct.App.l~83), vacated 
on other grounds, 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 1208 (1984), we summarized the standard 
liability applicable to the instant case. 
A person who enters the property of another passive penmSSlOn or as a 
mere social guest traditionally has been held to understand that he must take 
land as the possessor uses it. This entrant, classified by the law as a 
licensee, is expected to be alert and to protect himself from the risks he 
encounters. Accordingly, the duty owed to a licensee with respect to such 
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risks is narrowly restricted. The possessor is required simply to share his 
knowledge of dangerous conditions or dangerous activities with the licensee. 
When such a warning has been given, the possessor's knowledge is no longer 
superior to that of the licensee, and the possessor's duty extends no farther . 
... fd. at 652-53, 671 P.2d at 1115-16. 
Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho at 401,732 P.2d at 370 (Idaho App. 1987) (emphasis added) (in Evans, 
a decision that post-dated Stephens v. Stearns by three years, the plaintiff was a social guest at the 
home ofthe defendant Park when plaintiff fell and suffered injury). 
Seven years later the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed the duty owed by a possessor of land 
toward a licensee/social guest in Holzheimer v. Johannesen, supra. There, the Holzheimer Court 
recognized the distinction between invitees and licensees, stating that the possessor owes an invitee 
a duty of reasonable care. fd. at 399-400, 871 P.2d at 816-17. However, the Holzheimer Court 
stated that a possessor of the premises "is only required to share with the licensee knowledge of 
dangerous conditions or activities on the land." fd. at 400,871 P.2d at 817 (emphasis added). Surely 
the Holzheimer Court was aware of Stephens v. Stearns at the time yet did not broaden its holding 
to include guests of tenants in the same category as an invitee as requested by the Appellant herein. 
In fact, the distinction has been confirmed multiple times by the appellate courts of this State. 
See, e.g., Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 393, 179 P.3d 352,356 (App. 2008). Just last year the 
Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that the duty owed to a person injured on the land is determined by 
status of the person. See Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677, 273 P.3d 1266, 1270 
(2012). And, doing so Court affirmed that the occupant must only warn a licensee or social 
guest of dangerous conditions. 
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In sum, when a person is injured upon the land of another, the focus of the trial court is to 
determine the status of the injured party. lfthe injured person is an invitee, then the possessor 
of the owes a duty of reasonable care. In Stephens v. Stearns, supra, as will be further 
discussed, the Idaho Supreme Court included tenants in the category of an invitee, stating that a 
landlord owes his or her tenant a duty of reasonable care. Stephens, 106 Idaho at 257-58,678 P.2d 
at 49-50. In Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 749 P.2d 486 (1988), the Court included employees 
in the category of an invitee. 
If, however, the injured person and claimant is a licensee/social guest, then the possessor "is 
only required to share with the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land." 
See Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho at 677, 273 P.3d at 1270. See also Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 
at 401, 732 P.2d at 370 (possessor takes the land as he possesses it). That is premises liability law 
in Idaho with regard to the duty owed to a licensee/social guest and it has not wavered. 
With regard to whom the duty is beholden in the context of social guests to residential 
property, leased or otherwise, Idaho law is clear on this issue, as well. Indeed, for purposes of which 
party owes the duty, i.e., it is unquestionably the possessor of the land. See Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 
at 401, 732 P.2d at 370. That is, it is the occupier, not the O\vner and the occupier. 
Indeed, in Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1 1 (1989), the Court effectively 
that a tenant steps into the shoes of the landlord the tenant is the occupier of the premises 
and is aware of the alleged dangerous condition. at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329. the 
Court considered a claim where an injured third person sued the and o-vvner of a business 
CU.UHJJllH'vLlL for injuries. was an as opposed to 
matter. Id. at 589-90, 768 P.2d at 1322-23. NotVvlthstanding, the Harrison 
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[A] tenant or lessee, having control of the premises is deemed, so far as third 
parties are concerned, to be the owner, and in case of injury to third parties 
occasioned by the condition or use ofthe premises, the general rule is that the tenant 
or lessee may be liable for failure to keep the premises in repair. 
Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588,596,768 P.2d 1321, 1329 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added).2 Cf, Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 545, 347 P.2d 341, 347 *1959) (the host owes the duty 
of care). See also Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677, 273 P.3d 1266,1270 (2012) ("[T]he 
fact that a guest may be rendering a minor, incidental service to the host does not change the 
relationship [between them as a landowner and a licensee] "') (emphasis added). 
In Mooney v. Robinson, 93 Idaho 676, 471 P.2d 63 (1970), the plaintiff there was a guest at 
a house rented by the defendant Robinson when she slipped and fell down a flight of stairs. Id. at 
677,471 P.2d at 64. The plaintiff sued the tenant Robinson, not the owner or landlord. And, the 
Court affirmed the trial court's offered jury instructions, including the instruction which provided 
that provided the occupier of the premises "he has a duty to warn the licensee of the condition or 
otherwise obviate its risks." !d. at 678,471 P.2d at 65. 
In sum, the case authority in Idaho is clear that the possessor or tenant premises at issue 
owes the licensee! social guest a duty to warn ofknmvn dangerous conditions because the tenant steps 
into the shoes of the owner/landlord with regard to said dangerous conditions. other words, if the 
tenant is aware, the tenant holds the duty to warn. 
This makes sense and it conforms with the trial court's finding instant matter that the 
landlord was only required to disclose to the possessor, i.e., the tenant Winkelman in this instance, 
any alleged dangerous conditions. It thereafter was possessor's to disclose 
2See 3.15 ("The owner [or] occupant owes a duty to warn a licensee ... 
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adverse conditions to his social guest. See R., Vol. I, p. 101-02. In other words, the Respondent in 
instant matter fulfilled her by warning Winkelman. 
3. Appellant's Misunderstanding: of Stephens v. Stearns, supra. 
With that, the Appellant argues that the Court in Stephens v. Stearns, supra, "brought to an 
end the old common law of landlord immunity," and held that landlords are required to 
"exercise reasonable care under the circumstances" toward all who come onto the property. See 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10; see also Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho at 257, 678 P.2d at 49 (emphasis 
added). This is where the Appellant errs. She reads the words, "under the circumstances" in 
Stephens to mean "under all circumstances," regardless of the status of the injured person. 
The Appellant mistakenly reads the Stephens decision as having eliminated the distinction 
between injured third persons who come onto the property of another with respect to the duty owed. 
Moreover, she mistakenly reads Stephens with regard to whom the duty is beholden when she argues 
that the Respondent nonetheless failed to warn. 
Stephens, as the Court knows, regarded a situation where a tenant was injured due to the 
condition of the property. Stephens, 106 Idaho at 252,678 P.2d at 44. The Stephens decision was 
therefore limited to the circumstances in Stephens and the status of the tenant. That is, whether the 
tenant was an invitee or a Stephens did not consider the status of a social guest of a tenant. 3 
3To further illustrate that the Stephens holding was germane to only the circumstances involving the 
duty owed by a landlord to tenant, the Court considered the implied warranty of habitability owed 
by a landlord to his or her tenant, and not the guest of a tenant, under Idaho Code § 6-320, stating, 
"Our embracement of this rule is further supported by our legislature's enactment of a statutory 
version ofthe implied warranty of habitability, I.C. § 6-320." Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho at 258, 
n. 3,678 P.2d at 50, n. 3 (citation omitted). Indeed, a guest ofa tenant does not have standing to sue 
a landlord under I.C. § 6-320. That statute requires that a "tenant may file an action against a 
landlord for damages and specific performance for ... [m]aintaining the premises in a manner 
hazardous to the health or safety of the tenant." Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70, 73, 233 P.3d 1,4 
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its holding that a landlord owes his or her tenant a duty of reasonable care. Stephens, 106 
Idaho at 257-58,678 P.2d at 49-50.4 
More importantly for purposes oftms matter, at no time did the Stephens Court, or the Sharp 
Court that matter, discuss and expand the scope of the duty owed to a social guest a tenant. 
is, neither Stephens nor Sharp eliminated the traditional status of a licensee. Rather, those 
Courts simply expanded the definition of an invitee to include the tenant of a landlord, but did not 
include the guests of tenants. The reason was to conform with I.C. § 6-320. See, supra, n. 4. 
Unfortunately, the Appellant refuses to read Stephens, as well as Sharp, in the context it was 
intended, i.e., to reconcile with Idaho Code § 6-320, and continues to believe that in light of Stephens 
a landlord owes all individuals who come onto the property, regardless of status, a duty of reasonable 
care. Not only is this an unsupported and expansive stretch of the Stephens holding, it is completely 
illogical in light of decades of decisions developing premises liability law in Idaho with regard to 
the distinction between the status of the injured person and relative duties owed.5 
(2008). However, the statute only applies to an action brought by the tenant. Not a third party. Id. 
at 74, 233 P .3d at 5. Thus, the decision in Stephens to include tenants in the category of an invitee 
was to square with legislative intent. 
4In Sharp v. Moore, 118 Idaho 297, 796 P.2d 506 (1990), the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed 
Stephens v. Stearns, supra, holding that a landlord owes a duty of reasonable care to the tenant 
his or her property. Id. at 300, 796 P.2d at 509. The Court did not say that a landlord also owes 
same duty to the guests of the tenant. 
Appellant also misreads and disregards the Respondent's arguments and the trial 
findings when she argues at page 19 of Appellant's opening Brief that "[i]fthe Stephens rule 
not apply to tenant's guests, [Respondent] would have no duty to [the Appellant] not even a 
to warn .... " This is incorrect. As stated, the landlord/oVvTIer owes a duty to warn licensees a 
dangerous condition. Here, the Respondent did so by informing the tenant Winkelman. In light 
the decisions in Evans and Harrison, the tenant, as the possessor of the premises with knowledge 
of the condition, therefore was "deemed, so far as third parties are concerned, to be the ovmer. .. " and 
stepped into the shoes of the Respondent. Evans, 112 Idaho at 401, 732 P.2d at 370; Harrison, 115 
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Likewise, the Appellant's reliance on a concurring opinion in Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 
867, 749 P.2d 486 (1988), is misplaced. To refresh, in Marcher, the injured party plaintiff was an 
of the tenant and sued the landlord/defendant. Id. at 868, 749 P.2d at 487. The injured 
party was not a social guest. Again, an employee is on the premises for a business purpose and is 
more akin to an invitee. This is a clear distinction a social guest. 
In fact, the Marcher Court noted the same and said that the employee was tantamount to an 
invitee and should be treated as an invitee. The reason is because "an employee will proceed to 
encounter the dangerous condition in order to keep his or her job. In the present case the plaintiff was 
performing duties on the second floor of the condominium at the request of the tenant." !d. at 871, 
749 P.2d at 490. 
With that, the Marcher Court stated that the correct standard to apply to the circumstance 
where an employee is injured is that "a lessor may be liable to an invitee/employee who suffered 
injuries proximately caused by unsafe condition of the premises even though the danger is obvious 
and known to such invitee." Id. at 871, 749 P.2d at 490 (emphasis added). 
In sum, neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals have expanded the definition of invitee 
to include socials guests of a residential tenant. duty owed remains a duty to warn the social 
guest, or licensee, of "dangerous conditions or on the land." See Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 
152 Idaho at 677, 273 P.3d at 1270. Moreover, appellate courts ofIdaho have not held that the 
owed to social is beholden anyone other the possessor residential 
property. To the contrary, it is host, or person possession of premises deemed to be 
O\vner, who is to or her knowledge dangerous conditions. 
at 768 P.2d at 1329. 
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See also Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho at 545, 347 P.2d at 347, Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho at 401, 732 
at 370, and Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329. 
Perhaps realizing there are no cases in Idaho which Appellant's position, she turns 
case authority from New Hampshire, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts. However, cases 
those jurisdictions have no bearing or weight in the State ofIdaho. And, more importantly, the 
'-'~L""",V courts ofIdaho surely were aware of those relatively old cases when it issued its decisions 
Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400, 732 P.2d 369 (App. 1987), Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 
871 P.2d 814 (1994), and Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588,596,768 P.2d 1321, 1329 (1989), 
among others. 
Of course, as noted, the Evans, Holzheimer, and Harrison line of cases all provide that the 
possessor of property must only share with the guest his or her knowledge of dangerous conditions. 
And, they all held that the possessor of property steps into the shoes of the owner of the property, 
and is deemed to be the owner with regard to the duty owed by to an invitee, licensee, social guest 
or trespasser so long as the possessor knows of the existing hazard. 
In sum, the law in Idaho is well established. First, the trial court is to determine the status 
ofthe person injured. Here, the Appellant was a social guest. That is undisputed. The next step for 
trial court is to determine the scope of the duty owed. noted, the duty owed to a guest 
is to warn said guest of known dangerous conditions. This may not be disputed under the current 
state of the law Idaho. Here, the court found that the owed to the Appellant was to warn 
of any dangerous conditions. R., Vol. I, p. 99. 
The third step for the trial court is to ""'-",vB,CLLLj' .... who owes the duty to 
this goes without saying as it is the one who has control of the premises who owes the duty. 
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See Boots ex reI. Boots v. TiVinters, 179 P.3d at 356, 145 Idaho at 399 (premises liability focuses on 
one who has control of the premises.) However, the Appellant has made this an issue. 
as clearly noted, Idaho law clearly provides that the possessor of or one who 
control, owes a duty to warn a social guest of hazards that were known to the possessor, and not 
reasonably discoverable by the social guest. The final step of course, the trial court or a jury 
to determine whether the duty was fulfilled. 
based on the undisputed facts, the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from 
same is that the Respondent fulfilled her duty, i.e., she did not breach a duty of care. Indeed, 
tenant in the instant matter, Winkelman, was the sole occupier and there is no dispute that 
Winkelman was warned of the alleged dangerous condition by the Respondent. R., Vol. I, p. 101. 
Moreover, Winkelman, as possessor of the premises with knowledge of the alleged dangerous 
condition, was "deemed, so far as third parties are concerned, to be the owner ... " and hence stepped 
into the shoes of the Respondent. Therefore, the Respondent fulfilled her duty to warn as she 
informed Winkelman of the alleged dangerous condition. That is all that was required of her and 
nothing else under Idaho law. Meaning, she did not breach a duty of care. 
At juncture, Winkelman, as the occupant and possessor, had the duty to warn the 
of the alleged dangerous condition. R., Vol. I, 101-02. Noone else was required to 
carry out a Whether Winkelman extended the warning or not is a matter between Winkelman 
L ",,'fJ"'UULLL. However, since the Respondent fulfilled trial court nrrw,p,-I 
Respondent from case. 
It is it is corltmues to mlsurLderst,m 
bet,veen status of injured persons for in Idaho. In fact, 
Appellant has to one case in Idaho where a possessor of residential property owes a social 
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guest a duty of reasonable care. She cannot because it does not exist. Moreover, the Appellant has 
failed to point to once case where a residential1andlord can be held liable even after fulfilling his 
or duty to warn of a dangerous condition on the property. 
Ifthe Appellant's position were the law and residential landlords had to warn every guest of 
a tenant about any dangerous conditions, even though said landlord already warned the tenant of the 
same, then landlords would be liable for the tenant's negligence in every instance. Including the 
instance where the CvH,,,-HC, who was previously infonned of a condition by the landlord, failed to 
disclose said condition to guests. In other words, under the Appellant's rationale, the landlord 
becomes an ultimate insurer irregardless of the tenant's duty. Frankly, under the Appellant's 
rationale, it is tantamount to strict liability. That is, because a guest was injured then the landlord 
is liable because whether there was a breach of duty is irrelevant. This would be contradictory to the 
law of Idaho as well as public policy because it would place a inconceivably costly and onerous 
burden on landlords. For example, landlords would be compelled to pay for increased insurance and 
pass those costs onto the tenants, many of whom cannot afford the same; and, it would essentially 
render meaningless renter's insurance. 
Nonetheless, under the law in this State, the Respondent respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the trial court's findings below that the Appellant was only entitled to warned of a 
dangerous condition, that the Respondent did in fact warn the tenant of the U.H'VF,~''-' dangerous 
condition and "'''to'Trp'C> the tenant owed the Appellant the duty of care. In sum, 
requests that this Court affinn the trial court's finding that Respondent fulfilled 
instance, i.e., the Respondent did not breach a care. 
4. General Dutv of Care. 
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Respondent 
duty of care 
The Appellants's final argument also does not comport with Idaho law. Appellant 
argues that the Respondent may be liable because the Respondent owed a general duty to act 
reasonable care under all circumstances. This, as the Court knows, is the "balancing 
approach." It is not applicable the instant matter. See Boots ,,: Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 179 
P.3d 352, 357 (Idaho App. 2008) ("We engage in a balancing of the harm only in those rare 
situations when we are called upon to extend a duty beyond the scope previously imposed or when 
a duty has not previously been recognized.")6 Here, the appellate courts of this state have defined 
the duties owed to invitees, licensees/social guests, and trespassers with regard to hazardous 
conditions. To accept Appellant's position would render Idaho premises liability law meaningless.' 
C. Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal. 
On appeal, the Respondent requests attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 and LA.R. 41 on the 
basis that the Appellant brought this appeal simply to second guess the trial court and as such said 
appeal is frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. See Rendon v. Paskett, 126 Idaho 944, 
945,894 P.2d 775, 776 (Ct.App.1995). Fmiher, the Respondent requests costs under LA.R. 40. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the District Court's February 6, 2013, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order and its February 12,2013, Judgment the matter because the Appellant has failed to 
6The reason the Boots Court discussed the "balancing of approach to UvJeULJ.Hl", a duty is 
because Boots was not a premises liability case involving the physical condition at 393, 
179 P.3d at 356. 
turns to Sharp v. Ala are , 118 Idaho 297, 506 (1990) for 
misplaced reliance because while the Sharp Court generally addressed the balancing 
approach, it did so by analogy to establish reasons a owes an invitee a duty of 
reasonable care. Id at 301, 796 P.2d at 510. 
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demonstrate that the District Court based its Decision and the subsequent Judgment on an erroneous 
conclusion of law, or that it abused its discretion applying the applicable law. Moreover, 
Court should sustain the conclude that the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order was 
sufficiently based in law and fact. Finally, Respondent requests &'1 award of fees and costs and 
incurred defending this Appeal. 
DATED this K day of <err ,2013. 
I 
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